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ABSTRACT
We consider a market model that consists of financial investors and
producers of a commodity. Producers optionally store some produc-
tion for future sale and go short on forward contracts to hedge the
uncertainty of the future commodity price. Financial investors take po-
sitions in these contracts in order to diversify their portfolios. The spot
and forward equilibrium commodity prices are endogenously derived
as the outcome of the interaction between producers and investors. As-
suming that both are utility maximizers, we first prove the existence of
an equilibrium in an abstract setting. Then, in a framework where the
consumers’ demand and the exogenously priced financial market are
correlated, we provide semi-explicit expressions for the equilibrium
prices and analyze their dependence on the model parameters. The
model can explain why increased investors’ participation in forward
commodity markets and higher correlation between the commodity
and the stock market could result in higher spot prices and lower for-
ward premia.
KEYWORDS: Commodities, equilibrium, spot and forward prices, for-
ward premium, stock and commodity market correlation.
AUTHORS INFO
a University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli and Dim-
itriou Str., 18534 Piraeus, Greece
b University of Konstanz, Universitätstraße
10, 78464 Konstanz
c Institute of Mathematics, TU Berlin, Straße
des 17. Juni 136, 10623 Berlin, Germany
1 anthropel@unipi.gr
2 kupper@uni-konstanz.de
3 papapan@math.tu-berlin.de
PAPER INFO
AMS CLASSIFICATION: 91B50, 90B05
JEL CLASSIFICATION: Q02, G13, G11, C62
1. Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the futures and forward contracts written on commodities have been a
widely popular investment asset class for many financial institutions. As indicatively reported
in [17], the value of index-related futures’ holdings in commodities grew from $15 billion in
2003 to more than $200 billion in 2008.1 This significant inflow of funds has coincided, up to
IWe are grateful to Ulrich Horst, Kasper Larsen, Dilip Madan, Christoph Mainberger, Steven Shreve, Ronnie Sir-
car and Stathis Tompaidis for helpful discussions and suggestions. We thank two anonymous referees for their
valuable comments that have significantly improved the paper. We also thank seminar participants at Carnegie
Mellon University, the 11th German Probability and Statistics Days in Ulm, the Workshop in New Directions
in Financial Mathematics and Mathematical Economics in Banff, the Workshop on Stochastic Methods in Fi-
nance and Physics in Crete, the International Conference in Advanced Finance and Stochastics in Moscow, the
Conference on Frontiers in Financial Mathematics in Dublin, the Conference on Stochastics of Environmental
and Financial Economics in Oslo, the 8th World Congress of the Bachelier Finance Society in Brussels, and the
Seminar in Stochastic Analysis and Stochastic Finance in Berlin for their comments. Financial support from the
IKYDA project “Stochastic Analysis in Finance and Physics” is gratefully acknowledged.
1According to a recent estimation by Barclays Capital, the total commodity-linked assets were around $325 billion
at the end of June 2014 (see Barclays Investment Bank 2014 and [33]).
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2008, with a steep increase in the spot and futures prices of the majority of commodities, espe-
cially the ones included in popular commodity indices. The comovement of amounts invested in
commodity-linked securities and the prices of the associated commodities continued even during
the prices’ bust in 2008 and their recovery which started in 2009; see e.g. the empirical studies
presented in Singleton [57], Tang and Xiong [60] and Buyuksahin and Robe [10].2 Furthermore,
several statistical studies have found that the correlation between commodity prices and the stock
market has grown during the last years. As an example, [10] argues that the correlation of the
U.S. stock market (weekly) returns and the returns of the GSCI commodity indices varies from
-38% to 40% depending on the period, and stays positive and away from zero after 2009; fur-
ther statistical evidence on the increased correlation are given in [60], [57] and in Singleton and
Thorp [56]. Therefore, the investment strategies of financial institutions on stock and commodity
markets should be considered in the same optimization problem and not independently.
The booms and busts of the prices of major commodities during the last decade has naturally
captured the interest of the academic community. The main question addressed is whether the
behavior of commodities’ prices is caused by the (enhanced by the financialization) positions of
speculators or by the fluctuations of fundamental economic factors (i.e. increased demand and
weakend supply).3 Even though there exist several empirical studies, the theoretical approaches
that link spot and forward prices of commodities with the rest of the investment assets are scarce.
The main goal of this paper, is to establish an equilibrium model that allows to endogenously
derive both the spot and the forward price of a commodity, and is flexible and general enough
to include not only the randomness of the commodity demand and the commodity holders’
storage option, but also risk averse agents and correlation between the stock and the commodity
market. In our model, equilibrium commodity prices are formed as the outcome of the interaction
between market participants, and simultaneously clear out the spot and the forward market.
The forces that lead to the market equilibrium are the producers’ goal to maximize their spot
revenues and optimally hedge the risk of the future commodity price, and the investors’ goal
to achieve an optimal portfolio strategy that, besides the stock market, includes also a position
in the commodity’s forward contracts. The model offers new insights on how specific model
inputs, such as the agents’ risk aversion, the correlation of the stock and commodity market and
the uncertainty of the future commodity price, influence the equilibrium prices and the related
risk premia.
1.1. Model description
We consider a model of two points in time: the initial one and a given (short-term) future horizon
T . We assume that the main market participants are the representative agents of the commodity’s
2In [57], it is shown that investors’ index positions in crude oil are highly correlated with crude oil prices, while
[10] provides statistical evidence which indicates that the excess speculation in U.S. Commodity Futures Markets
increased from 11% in 2000 to more than 40% in 2008. In theoretical terms, this correlation affects heavily the
agents’ optimization problems (see among others [11]).
3The opinion that speculative forces are the main reason for the booms and busts of commodity prices (especially in
oil and gas markets) is supported by the empirical studies in [33, 57, 60], while [10, 32, 52, 59] provide statistical
tests that are in favor of the fundamental economic reasoning (see also [39, 44]). For a more detailed literature
survey on this debate, we refer the reader to [33] and [52].
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holders/suppliers and the financial investors/speculators, who shall hereafter be called produc-
ers4 and investors5 respectively.
The producers’ source of income are the revenues from spot and future sales. While the com-
modity spot price could be determined by the spot commodity demand function, the future price
is subject to demand shocks. Assuming that producers are risk averse, their goal is not only to
maximize their spot revenues, but also to reduce their risk exposure to the future commodity
price by maximizing their expected utility.6 If the production schedule at the initial and future
time is a predetermined pair of units, producers have two decisions to make: what amount of the
production to supply in the spot market (inventory management) and what position to take in the
forward contract (hedging strategy). Provided they know the demand function of the commod-
ity’s consumers at the initial time, they can determine the commodity spot price by choosing the
amount of the inventory they will hold up to the terminal time. However, random demand shocks
at time T will shift the whole demand function to lower or higher levels (for instance, in Section
4 we suppose that the random shift of the demand function is driven by a vector of stochastic
market factors). Producers hedge the risk which stems from the future time demand function by
taking a short position in forward contracts written on the same commodity and with maturity
equal to T . The fact that the inventory will also be sold at time T makes the forward hedging
position even more important for the producers.7
The producers’ hedging demand is covered by financial investors, who take the opposite po-
sition in the forward commodity contracts and thus share some of the future price uncertainty
risk, possibly against a premium. They invest optimally in an exogenously priced stock market8
and are willing to take the future commodity price risk in order to better diversify their portfolio.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the correlation between commodity and stock market indices has
been shown to be away from zero. This correlation could be incorporated in a model where the
stock market price is driven by the same stochastic factors that drive the evolution of the com-
modity demand function. Given this correlation, the optimal investment strategy in the stock and
the commodity market should be considered in the same optimization problem. As in the pro-
ducers’ side, we assume that the investors are represented by an agent who is a utility maximizer
4We refer to the commodity sellers as producers by following the related literature (see e.g. [1, 6, 52]). Some authors
impose that the representative agent of the supply side is the commodity refiners or storage managers who hold
the production and in some cases control its supply in the market (see for instance [24, 49]). In our model, the
production schedule is a given input and the spot revenues of the producers come only from the commodity sales,
thus our findings apply directly in case the refiners are the ones that distribute the commodity in the market.
5As highlighted in [45], it is rather difficult to identify whether the long position in the commodity forward contracts
is taken by investors who just want to diversify or by speculators who invest based on specific predictions about
the move of commodity prices. As a matter of fact, the holders of a long position in the forward contract can also
be called insurers, since they undertake some of the producers’ risk. Without attempting to enter in this debate,
we will call the producers’ counterparties in the forward contract investors.
6The massive use of derivatives by natural gas and crude oil producers presented in Table 1 of [1] is a clear evidence
that commodity producers are indeed risk averse regarding their future revenues.
7The significance of the inventory policy in the spot and forward price fluctuations has been highlighted by many
authors, see e.g. [31, 44, 51, 57] for detailed discussions and statistical evidence, especially in the popular example
of crude oil prices.
8Here, exogenously means that investors in the commodity forward contract are price takers in the stock market.
This implies that the volume in the commodity forward contracts is not so large to influence the price of the stock
market, an assumption that is supported by the corresponding market volumes.
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and whose investment choices are the (possibly dynamic) trading strategy in the stock market
and the position in the forward commodity contract.
The optimization choices of both producers and investors clearly depend on the forward com-
modity price. We define as equilibrium forward price the price that clears the forward market
and at which both participants’ expected utilities are maximized. Given the forward price, the
producers optimally choose the inventory policy, which in turn gives the initial commodity sup-
ply and thus determines the spot price through the initial demand function of the consumers.
Therefore, by deriving the equilibrium forward commodity price, the equilibrium spot price as
well as the producers’ optimal inventory policy are also endogenously derived in our model.
1.2. Findings and contributions
The main mathematical result of this work is to prove, under CARA preferences and upon some
minor technical assumptions, that equilibrium spot and forward commodity prices exist. In this
proof, we use standard duality arguments to show that both producers’ and investors’ optimiza-
tion problems are well-defined and admit finite solutions. The existence of the forward commod-
ity equilibrium price is first proved for every fixed producers’ storage choice. Then, we show that
this equilibrium is stable with respect to the storage choice, which in turn guarantees the exis-
tence of the commodity market equilibrium. In fact, this stability result is interesting in its own
right, since it shows that the market clearing is stable with respect to any control variable which
belongs to a closed set of real numbers.
The constructive nature of the aforementioned proof allows us to derive implicit formulas
for spot and forward prices, which can be used to investigate how the main model parameters
influence the commodity market. We illustrate this using two examples with factors driven by
Lévy processes; first a Brownian motion and then a jump-diffusion process. The main results are
given below.
Focusing first on the equilibrium spot price, our results imply it is monotonic with respect to
the agents’ risk aversion coefficient; it is increasing for producers and decreasing for investors
(see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). When producers are more concerned about the commodity future
price uncertainty, they increase their position in the forward contract and hence lock the selling
price at the terminal time. As long as the hedging position is counterpartied by the investors,
high risk averse producers can increase their certain revenues today and at the same time hedge
their future price risk. What is very important in this monotonicity is the correlation between the
stock market and the demand random shocks. As it is illustrated in Section 5, when correlation
is away from zero, the equilibrium spot price is pushed upwards. This is mainly because higher
correlation means that investors are able to better hedge their risk exposure in the commodity
market by adjusting their investments in the stock market. Hence, they are willing to receive a
lower forward premium, thus making hedging cheaper for the producers. In particular, when the
investors are more risk averse, they reduce their share in the future commodity price risk; thus,
producers cannot hedge their future price risk which forces them to increase their supply in the
spot market. Therefore, the spot price is a decreasing function of investors’ risk aversion (all else
equal). Also, it follows that the producers’ ability to hedge their risk tends to increase the spot
equilibrium prices. Moreover, our model yields that the existence of a forward contract in the
commodity market stabilizes spot prices when there is scarcity of the commodity at the terminal
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time; in particular, the presence of forward contracts increases the current spot and decreases the
expected future spot price of the commodity.
The monotonicity of the spot price with respect to risk aversions could also be used to explain
how the participation of investors in the commodity forward markets could result in an increase
of spot commodity prices. Indeed, under CARA preferences the more investors participate in the
market, the higher the aggregate risk tolerance becomes or, equivalently, the lower the represen-
tative risk aversion’ coefficient becomes (see, among others, Wilson [61]). As discussed above,
this implies higher spot commodity price, a result that is consistent with the observed market
data (see e.g. [10] and Henderson et al. [33]). Similarly, we verify that more producers (of the
same total production) implies lower spot price.
Besides equilibrium commodity spot prices, our model allows to endogenously derive quanti-
ties that characterize the two major, and not mutually exclusive, theories of forward commodity
markets: the theory of storage and the theory of normal backwardation. Based on the ideas intro-
duced in Kaldor [40], Working [62] and Brennan [9], the theory of storage states that the holders
of the commodity inventories get an implicit benefit, called convenience yield, which implies the
value of the spot commodity consumption. This yield can be approximated by the difference be-
tween the spot and the forward price minus the cost of storage. Our equilibrium model verifies
that the convenience yield is increasing with respect to the producers’ risk aversion, meaning
that the more sensitive about the risk the producers are, the more commodity forward units they
hedge depressing the forward price (see Figure 5.6 for the Brownian motion example). A similar
increasing relation holds for the investors (these relations, in particular, generalize the results
of Proposition 1 in Acharya et al. [1]). However, the convenience yield is not always mono-
tonic with respect to the correlation coefficient. As discussed in Section 4, there are two effects
of opposing direction on the convenience yield, one coming from the decrease of the effective
investors’ risk aversion and other from the corresponding increase on the spot price. The total
effect mainly depends on the level of the agents’ risk aversions and the (uneven) production
levels at initial and terminal time (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7).
On the other hand, the theory of normal backwardation (see the seminal works by Keynes [43]
and Hicks [34]), states that there is a positive premium required by the investors in order to sat-
isfy the producers’ hedging demand in forward contracts. This premium, usually called forward
or insurance premium, is given as the percentage difference between the expected commodity
price at maturity and its forward price. As expected, this premium is increasing (decreasing)
with respect to investors’ (producers’) risk aversion.
In contrast to the existing literature, our model includes as an input the correlation between the
stock market and the commodity demand shock. Several empirical studies have shown that this
correlation is indeed non-zero and, as our results demonstrate, it does influence the equilibrium
prices heavily. In particular, as it is shown in Section 5, the effective investors’ risk aversion
coefficient is decreasing in the presence of non-zero correlation. This simply reflects the fact
that higher correlation means better hedging of the forward contract position by trading in the
stock market (provided there are no short-selling constraints on the investors’ trading strategies).
Hence, non-zero correlation has in principle the same effect on the equilibrium as a decrease in
the investors’ risk aversion (see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5). For instance, higher correlation (in
absolute values) means higher spot commodity price, a result that is also consistent with the
observed market data (see e.g. [60]). A similar effect is caused by an increased variance of the
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demand shock, which can be due to the presence of jumps (see Figure 5.5).
1.3. Relation with the existing literature
Equilibrium pricing models in markets that consist of utility maximizing agents have been re-
cently addressed by a number of authors in mathematical finance; see, among others, Anthro-
pelos and Žitkovic´ [4], Barrieu and El Karoui [7], Cheridito et al. [15], Filipovic´ and Kupper
[25], Horst and Müller [37] and Karatzas et al. [42]. The results in this literature however do not
cover the case of commodity forward contracts, not only because a commodity has a consump-
tion value which is reflected by the consumers’ demand function, but also due to the producers’
specific storage choice. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to apply a utility max-
imization criterion for spot and forward equilibrium prices of commodities, while considering
also the existence of a correlated stock market.
Theoretical studies of the equilibrium relationship between spot and forward commodity
prices go back to Anderson and Danthine [3], Stoll [58] and Hirshleifer [35, 36]. The results
of these seminal works are limited regarding the agents’ risk preferences, which are assumed
to be mean-variance, while recent extensions of this setting have followed different approaches
than ours. For instance in Baker [6], mean-variance optimization problems are imposed in a
discrete time dynamic model, where investors are the ones that have the storage option and the
consumers (the households) get utility from consumption and the wealth (numéraire units). In
Routledge et al. [51] and Pirrong [49], investors are assumed to be risk neutral and without ac-
cess to other financial markets, while forward prices are simply the expectations of future spot
prices. The interaction between the optimal storage and the investors’ optimal position in the
forward contract and its effect to spot and forward equilibrium prices are also studied in Ekeland
et al. [24]. However, in contrast to our model the investors trade only in forward contracts, while
the preferences are mean-variance, which means that they are not monotonic with respect to
futures revenues. More recently, endogenous commodity supply under asymmetric information
and limited participation has been developed in Leclercq and Praz [48]. Static mean-variance
models have been also studied and statistically tested in Acharya et al. [1] and Gorton et al.
[30], however neither the investors nor the producers trade in any other market outside of the
commodity market9. Hence, their theoretical results cover only a very special case of our model,
namely, when the stock and the commodity market are uncorrelated and the demand random
shift is normally distributed.10
The main novelties of our approach compared to the related literature are the consideration of
an exogenous stock market available in the investors’ trading set, the risk aversion of the agents’
preferences and the much richer family of processes that model the market factors.11 Indeed, as
9In [1] investors are assumed risk neutral, but the imposed capital constraints eventually lead to a mean-variance
optimization criterion, while in [30] there is a random supply shock at the terminal time, which however does not
change the general idea of the equilibrium setting.
10Continuous time dynamic models with random demand shocks and exogenously given spot prices have been
developed in [8] and [13].
11The seminal works [58] and [35] also include a correlated risky asset in the investors’ set of strategies, forming an
equilibrium framework. However, our results are more general regarding not only the utility preferences and the
stochasticity of the market model, but also the set of investors’ trading strategies.
6
has already been discussed, both the correlation between the stock and commodity market and
the jump component do influence the equilibrium prices.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the general framework for our equilib-
rium model. The well-posedness of the agents’ optimization problems and the existence of an
equilibrium are proved in Section 3. Section 4 studies a model with continuous trading under
Lévy dynamics, where semi-explicit formulas for equilibrium quantities are derived and dis-
cussed. Finally, Section 5 focuses on two examples that permit the illustration and a further
economic interpretation of the results. Technical proofs of Section 5 are placed in Appendix A.
2. A general framework for commodity prices
We start by describing a general modeling framework where the interaction of market partici-
pants determines the spot and forward prices of commodities. The model consists of a pair of
representative agents12: the producers produce the commodity, supply part of the production
at the spot market and store the rest, while they hedge their exposure to price fluctuations us-
ing forward contracts on the commodity. The investors invest in financial markets and, in order
to diversify their portfolio, they also invest in the commodities forward market. Moreover, the
model includes consumers who consume the commodity at the spot market. The goal is to de-
termine the price of the commodity that makes the forward market clear out, assuming that both
producers and investors are utility maximizers.
More specifically, the producers produce pi0 units of the commodity at the initial time 0 and
piT units at the terminal time T ; both pi0 and piT are assumed to be deterministic13. They offer
pi0 − α units at the spot market at time 0 and store the rest for time T . Furthermore, they hedge
their exposure by investing in the forward market. Therefore, their position at time T is
w(α, hp) = P0(pi0 − α)(1 +R) + PT (piT + α(1− ε)) + hp(PT − F ), (2.1)
where P0 and PT denote the spot price at times 0 and T respectively, R the discretely com-
pounded interest rate, ε ∈ [0, 1] the cost of storage considered as percentage of the stored units14,
F the forward price and hp the amount of forward contracts held by the producers. A positive
hp indicates a long position in the forward contract, while a negative hp amounts to a short one.
The producers’ utility is assumed to be exponential, henceforth their preferences are described
by
Up(v) = − 1
γp
logE
[
e−γpv
]
, (2.2)
where γp > 0. As in Anderson and Danthine [2, 3], their problem is to find an optimal storage
strategy α ∈ [0, pi0] and an optimal hedging strategy hp ∈ R that maximize the utility of their
12The representation by a unique agent is widely used in this literature, see [1, 8, 24, 30, 57] among others.
13This assumption means that the producers control the supply of their commodity only through the inventory man-
agement and not by changing their production plans, which can be prohibitively costly in the short-term (see also
the related comment in [1]).
14The representation of the storage cost as percentage is common in the related literature, see e.g. [1] and [30]. The
constant cost rate ε is usually referred to as the depreciation rate.
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position (2.1). Therefore, their utility maximization problem is
Πp := sup
α∈[0,pi0], hp∈R
Up
(
w(α, hp)
)
. (2.3)
The spot price of the commodity is the price at which the consumers’ demand equals the
producers’ supply. The consumers’ demand at the initial time is given by a strictly decreasing
and linear function15
ψ0(x) = µ−mx, (2.4)
where µ ∈ R and m ∈ R+, while x denotes the price. The parameter m is a measure of the
elasticity of demand for the commodity. The demand at the terminal time is random and depends
on the factors driving the commodities market, which are incorporated in a random variable X .
The demand function at the terminal time is of the form
ψT (x) = ψ0(x) +X. (2.5)
In other words, we assume that the shape and the elasticity of the demand function remain the
same, however there is a random shift16 acting on it. This shift may be, for example, the result
of an increase or decrease in the prices of the competitive commodities, of fluctuations in a
dominated currency, or of an exogenous increase in the demand for every price level. Since the
demand function is linear, the inverse demand function is also linear and equals
φ0(y) =
µ− y
m
and φT (y) =
µ+X − y
m
. (2.6)
Henceforth, if the producers store α units at the initial time, the spot price of the commodity,
determined by the equilibrium condition between demand and supply, equals
P0 = φ0(pi0 − α) = φ0(pi0) + α
m
, (2.7)
while the commodity spot price at the terminal time is
PT = φT
(
piT + α(1− ε)
)
= φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
+
X
m
. (2.8)
The producers control the spot price by choosing the inventory policy. By storing more com-
modity units they increase the spot price, but they also increase their exposure to the variation
of the future spot price since the stored units will be supplied at the next time period.
The investors take a position hs in the forward contract and invest in an exogenously17 priced
financial market. Their position at time T equals
w(G, hs) = hs(PT − F ) +G, (2.9)
15The linearity of the demand function is imposed to facilitate the analysis. The limitation of this assumption does
not exclude from our study the main characteristics of the demand, namely its elasticity and its random nature
at terminal time. Let us also mention, that for a short time horizon a first order approximation of the demand
function should suffice (see also the related discussion in [1, 24]).
16A similar random shift has already been used in the literature, see for instance [49].
17In other words, the investors are price-takers when they invest in the financial market.
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for G ∈ G, where G is a set of random variables that models discounted trading outcomes at-
tainable with zero initial wealth. This general formulation allows to consider different scenarios
simultaneously.
Example 2.1. The simplest scenario is G = {0}, whence the investors can only invest in the
forward contract. Another scenario is to consider an asset price process S and denote byG(θ) =∫ ·
0 θudSu the gains process for a trading strategy θ. In that case, the set of trading outcomes G is
given by
G = {GT (θ) : θ ∈ Θ},
for a set Θ of admissible, self-financing trading strategies. Transaction costs can be easily incor-
porated as well by setting
G = {GT (θ)− k(θ) : θ ∈ Θ},
where k : Θ→ R is a concave function. ♦
We assume that the investors’ utility is also exponential with γs > 0, that is, their preferences
are described by
Us(v) = − 1
γs
logE
[
e−γsv
]
, (2.10)
therefore their utility maximization problem reads as
Πs := sup
hs∈R, G∈G
Us
(
hs(PT − F ) +G
)
. (2.11)
The maximization problem of both participants depends on the forward price F . This price is
determined by the equilibrium in the forward market, which is defined below.
Definition 2.2. A triplet (αˆ, hˆ, Fˆ ) is called an equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Market clearing: the forward market clears out in the sense that
hˆ := hp(Fˆ ) = −hs(Fˆ ). (2.12)
• Optimality: the pair (αˆ, hˆ) is optimal for the producers’ problem Πp and hˆ is optimal for
the investors’ problem Πs.
The price Fˆ = F (αˆ) is called the equilibrium commodity forward price at maturity T . The
induced price Pˆ0 := P0(αˆ) derived by (2.7) is called the equilibrium commodity spot price at 0.
Remark 2.3. The utility maximization problems of both agents are equivalent to risk minimiza-
tion problems relative to the entropic risk measure; see e.g. Barrieu and El Karoui [7]. The risk
measure point of view is more natural for certain agents, such as a corporation managing its risk
exposure. 
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3. Equilibrium in the general framework
The aim of this section is to show that an equilibrium exists in the general modeling framework
described above, under mild assumptions on the random variable X and the set of trading out-
comes G. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space where F = FT . In the sequel all equalities and
inequalities between random variables are understood in the P-almost sure sense. The interior
and the boundary of a set K are denoted by K◦ and ∂K, respectively, and the domain of a
function f by domf .
We denote the set of exponential moments of X by UX = {u ∈ R : E[euX ] <∞} and define
the cumulant generating function of X by
κX(u) = logE
[
euX
]
, u ∈ UX . (3.1)
The following conditions will be used throughout this work:
(EM) 0 ∈ U◦X .
(COE) If ∂UX = ±∞ then the following limit holds:
lim
z→±∞
κX(z)
|z| = +∞.
The next lemma summarizes some useful properties of the cumulant generating function.
Lemma 3.1. The cumulant generating function κX is convex and lower semicontinuous.
Proof. Convexity follows directly from Hölder’s inequality; for p, q ∈ (0, 1) conjugate, we have
that
κX(pu+ qv) = logE
[
epuXeqvX
]
≤ log {(E[euX ])p(E[evX ])q} = pκX(u) + qκX(v).
In order to show lower semicontinuity, consider a sequence un → u; then eunx is a sequence of
positive functions. Applying Fatou’s lemma, we get
lim inf
un→u
κX(un) = lim inf
un→u
logE
[
eunX
]
≥ logE[ lim inf
un→u
eunX
]
= κX(u). 
3.1. Producers’ optimization problem
The first step is to consider the producers’ optimization problem and show that it admits a maxi-
mizer under mild assumptions. The producers’ position, using the spot market equilibrium con-
10
ditions (2.7) and (2.8), can be written as
w(α, hp) = P0(pi0 − α)(1 +R) + PT (piT + α(1− ε)) + hp(PT − F )
(2.7)
=
(2.8)
(
φ0(pi0) +
α
m
)
(pi0 − α)(1 +R)− hpF
+
(
piT + α(1− ε) + hp
)(
φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
+
X
m
)
=: q(α, hp) + `(α, hp)X, (3.2)
where q is a quadratic function18 in α and hp of the form
q(α, hp) = −α2 1 +R+ (1− ε)
2
m
+ α
2(1 +R)pi0 − 2(1− ε)piT − (R+ ε)µ
m
− αhp 1− ε
m
− hp
(
F − µ− piT
m
)
+ piTφ0(piT ) + pi0φ0(pi0)(1 +R), (3.3)
while ` is a bilinear function in α and hp given by
`(α, hp) =
α(1− ε) + hp + piT
m
. (3.4)
Using the translation invariance of the exponential utility function, the producers’ utility takes
the form
Up
(
w(α, hp)
)
= − 1
γp
logE
[
exp
(
− γp
{
q(α, hp) + `(α, hp)X
})]
= q(α, hp)− 1
γp
logE
[
exp
(
− γp`(α, hp)X
)]
= q(α, hp)− 1
γp
κX
(− γp`(α, hp)), (3.5)
assuming that −γp`(α, hp) ∈ UX . In the sequel, we will work with the extended producers’
utility U˜p(w(α, hp)) which is defined as follows:
U˜p
(
w(α, hp)
)
=
{
Up
(
w(α, hp)
)
, if (α, hp) ∈ U˜X ,
−∞, otherwise, (3.6)
where U˜X =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : −γp`(x1, x2) ∈ UX
}
. The producers’ optimization problem (2.3)
can then be written as follows
Πp = sup
α∈[0,pi0]
sup
hp∈R
U˜p
(
w(α, hp)
)
= sup
α∈[0,pi0]
sup
hp∈R
{up(α, hp)− hpF} = sup
α∈[0,pi0]
{−u∗p(α, F )}, (3.7)
18It follows directly from (3.2) (see also the associated formulas in subsection 5.1), that if the parameter µ is suf-
ficiently small, then producers may have motive to discard the commodity, in the sense that the total optimal
supply is less than the total production, even if the demand function is deterministic. We can avoid such cases, by
assuming that the parameter µ is sufficiently large. Note that µ could be considered as the consumers’ demand
when the commodity has zero price, hence assuming large values for µ is a reasonable assumption.
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where
up(α, h
p) =
{
q(α, 0)− 1γpκX
(− γp`(α, hp))− hp`(α,−µ), if (α, hp) ∈ U˜X ,
−∞, otherwise, (3.8)
while u∗p(α, ·) denotes the conjugate function of up(α, ·), for every α ∈ [0, pi0].
Proposition 3.2. Assume that conditions (EM) and (COE) hold. Then, for every F ∈ R there
exists a maximizer (αˆ, hˆp) for the producers’ problem Πp such that (αˆ, hˆp) ∈ U˜X .
Proof. The function U˜p(w(α, hp)) in (3.5) is upper semicontinuous, strictly concave in α and
concave in hp, since q is quadratic, ` is linear and κX is convex and lower semicontinuous in
its arguments; see Lemma 3.1 and (3.3)–(3.4). Observe that α takes values in a bounded set.
If the set UX is also bounded, then the existence of a maximizer follows by the concavity and
the upper semicontinuity of Up(w(a, hp)). Otherwise, if UX is unbounded, using Assumption
(COE), the linearity of ` in α and that α belongs to a bounded set, we get that
lim
hp→±∞
inf
α∈[0,pi0]
κX
(− γp`(α, hp))
|hp| = +∞. (3.9)
Therefore, Up(w(α, hp)) is coercive in hp resulting in the existence of a maximizer. Finally, if
(αˆ, hˆp) does not belong to U˜X , then the utility of the producers is not maximized, see (3.6). 
Corollary 3.3. Assume that conditions (EM) and (COE) hold. Then, the function up(α, ·) is
concave and upper semicontinuous for every α ∈ [0, pi0]. In addition, it is coercive uniformly in
α, that is
lim
hp→±∞
sup
α∈[0,pi0]
up(α, h
p)
|hp| = −∞. (3.10)
Remark 3.4. It follows from (3.3), that small production at time T raises the producers’ desire
to store, even when the future demand function is deterministic. This occurs because a possible
scarcity of the commodity at time T would result in higher future spot prices, hence producers
would be better off storing some production and selling it at time T . On the other hand, higher
future production decreases the optimal storage choice. Hence, the producers’ desire to balance
uneven productions is an important feature that influences the optimal storage choice. 
3.2. Investors’ optimization problem
The second step is to analyze the structure and properties of the investors’ optimization problem.
Although we cannot prove the existence of a maximizer at this level of generality, the results we
obtain are sufficient to show the existence of an equilibrium in the next subsection.
Let Q be a probability measure on (Ω,F). The relative entropy H(Q|P) of Q with respect to
P is defined by
H(Q|P) =
{
EQ
[
ln
(
dQ
dP
)]
, if Q P,
+∞, otherwise.
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Given α ∈ [0, pi0], the spot price of the commodity PT = PT (α) is provided by (2.8). Define
the function
us(α, h
s) := sup
G∈G
Us
(
hsPT +G
)
, (3.11)
for a convex set G of FT -measurable random variables that contains 0. In order to prove the
existence of an equilibrium we will make use of the following assumption:
(USC) The function hs 7→ us(α, hs) is upper semicontinuous for every α ∈ [0, pi0].
The function hs 7→ us(α, hs) is also concave for every α ∈ [0, pi0], while the investors’ opti-
mization problem can be expressed as follows
Πs = sup
hs∈R
sup
G∈G
Us
(
hs(PT − F ) +G
)
= sup
hs∈R
{us(α, hs)− hsF} . (3.12)
Throughout this section, we will also make use of the sets
MG :=
{
Q P : H(Q|P) <∞ and EQ[G] ≤ 0 for all G ∈ G
}
and
QX :=
{
Q P : EQ[|X|] <∞}.
The financial market is free of arbitrage if MG 6= ∅. This is a sufficient condition, but not
necessary, since it also requires the entropy to be finite. In the sequel, we also need the existence
of at least one probability measure inMG that belongs to QX19. We state these requirements in
the following condition:
(NA) MG ∩QX 6= ∅.
Proposition 3.5. Assume that (NA) holds. Then, for each α ∈ [0, pi0] there exists F = F (α) ∈
R such that
lim sup
hs→±∞
us(α, h
s)
|hs| < +∞, (3.13)
and
−u∗s(α, F ) := sup
hs∈R
{us(α, hs)− hsF} < +∞. (3.14)
Proof. Fix Q ∈ MG ∩ QX . Using (NA) and (2.8) we get that PT = PT (α) ∈ L1(Q) for all
α ∈ [0, pi0]. According to Föllmer and Schied [26, Lemma 3.29], for each G ∈ G, hs ∈ R and
n ∈ N it holds that
Us
(
[hsPT +G] ∨ (−n)
)
= − 1
γs
logE
[
exp
{− γs([hsPT +G] ∨ (−n))}]
≤ EQ
[
(hsPT +G) ∨ (−n)
]
+
1
γs
H(Q|P). (3.15)
19As we will see later on, this assumption is needed in order to guarantee that the commodity spot price PT (α) ∈
L1(Q) for at least one Q ∈ MG and α ∈ [0, pi0], which eventually implies that the investors’ utility is bounded
from above. In the market model of Section 4, this assumption implies, in particular, that the investor’s indiffer-
ence price of the commodity is bounded from above; see also Remark 4.6.
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Since (PT +G)+ ∈ L1(Q) and EQ[G] ≤ 0, monotone convergence implies that
us(α, h
s) = sup
G∈G
{
− 1
γs
logE
[
exp
{− γs(hsPT +G)}]} ≤ hsEQ[PT ] + 1
γs
H(Q|P), 
which yields (3.13). Finally, defining F := EQ[PT ] we obtain that
sup
hs∈R
{
us(α, h
s)− hsF} ≤ 1
γs
H(Q|P) < +∞. (3.16)
3.3. Existence of equilibrium
We are now ready to show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists in the general
modeling framework described in Section 2. Explicit, and easily verifiable, conditions for the
uniqueness of the equilibrium are also provided. We start with some preparatory results from
convex analysis before stating and proving the main theorem.
According to (3.7), the producers’ optimization problem is described by
Πp = sup
α∈[0,pi0]
sup
hp∈R
{up(α, hp)− hpF} = − inf
α∈[0,pi0]
inf
hp∈R
{hpF − up(α, hp)}
= sup
α∈[0,pi0]
{−u∗p(α, F )}. (3.17)
Similarly, from (3.12) and (3.14) the investors’ optimization problem is described by
Πs = sup
hs∈R
{us(α, hs)− hsF} = −u∗s(α, F ). (3.18)
In the sequel we will make use of several results from convex analysis; we refer the reader to
Rockafellar [50] for a comprehensive introduction. We define the sup-convolution of up and us
via
u(α, h) := sup
hp+hs=h
{up(α, hp) + us(α, hs)} , (3.19)
and we know that its conjugate function satisfies
u∗(α, F ) = inf
h∈R
{hF − u(α, h)} = u∗p(α, F ) + u∗s(α, F ); (3.20)
cf. [50, Theorem 16.4]. Moreover, it holds that
u(α, h) = inf
F∈R
{hF − u∗(α, F )} (3.21)
and we know that F belongs to the supergradient of u(α, h), denoted by ∂u(α, h), if the equality
u(α, h) = hF − u∗(α, F ) (3.22)
is satisfied; see [50, Theorem 23.5]
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Theorem 3.6. Assume that conditions (EM), (COE), (USC) and (NA) hold, and suppose that
−γp`(pi0, 0) ∈ U◦X . (3.23)
Then there exists an equilibrium (αˆ, hˆ, Fˆ ).
Remark 3.7 (Uniqueness). The equilibrium in Theorem 3.6 is not unique in general, since the
supergradient ∂u(α, 0) is not a singleton. However, if the functions hp 7→ up(α, hp) and hs 7→
us(α, h
s) are differentiable for all α ∈ [0, pi0], then the equilibrium commodity forward price
is unique. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 3.6 yields that any equilibrium commodity forward
price Fˆ satisfies Fˆ ∈ ∂u(αˆ, 0) for the unique optimizer αˆ ∈ [0, pi0]. If up(αˆ, ·) and us(αˆ, ·) are
both differentiable then it follows, for instance from Lemma 1.6.5 in Cheridito [14], that u(αˆ, ·)
is differentiable at 0, in which case ∂u(αˆ, 0) is a singleton. Moreover, if hp 7→ up(αˆ, hp) and
hs 7→ us(αˆ, hs) are strictly concave, then also the optimal strategy hˆ is unique. These conditions
can be easily verified in the examples; see Sections 4 and 5. 
Proof. The proof of this theorem is carried out in three steps and the strategy is represented by
the following diagram:
αn α
F (αn) = Fn F = F (α)
S1
S2
S1
S3
The first step is to show that for every fixed α there exists an equilibrium. Then, we consider a
sequence (αn) maximizing the producers’ utility that converges to some α. The previous step
yields the existence of equilibrium prices F (αn) = Fn and F (α) corresponding to αn and α,
respectively. The second step is to show that the equilibrium prices Fn converge to some limit,
denoted by F . The final step is to show that F equals F (α).
Step 1: Fix α ∈ [0, pi0]. According to Propositions 3.2 and 3.5, there exists a price F =
F (α) ∈ R such that
u(α, h) ≤ sup
hp
{up(α, hp)− hpF}+ sup
hs
{us(α, hs)− hsF}+ hF <∞. (3.24)
Using (3.23) and conditions (EM) and (NA) we get that up(α, ·) > −∞ and us(α, ·) > −∞ in
a neighborhood of 0. Hence u(α, ·) > −∞ on a neighborhood of 0, therefore 0 belongs to the
interior of domu(α, ·), which by [50, Theorem 23.4] implies that ∂u(α, 0) 6= ∅. Let F (α) be an
element of the supergradient ∂u(α, 0). Then
u(α, 0) ≤ sup
hp
{up(α, hp)− hpF (α)}+ sup
hs
{us(α, hs)− hsF (α)}
= −u∗p(α, F (α))− u∗s(α, F (α))
= u(α, 0) = sup
hp+hs=0
{up(α, hp) + us(α, hs)} , (3.25)
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where the second to last equality follows from (3.20) and (3.22) using that h = 0. By means
of Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.5 we deduce that the function h 7→ up(α, h) + us(α,−h)
is concave and tends to −∞ as h → ±∞; see in particular (3.10) and (3.13). Therefore, the
supremum in (3.25) is attained for hp(α), hs(α) ∈ R with hp(α) + hs(α) = 0. Moreover, it
follows from (3.25) that
hp(α) = argmax {up(hp, α)− hpF (α)} and hs(α) = argmax {us(hs, α)− hsF (α)} .
In other words, for every fixed α ∈ [0, pi0] there exists an equilibrium.
Step 2: Consider an optimizing sequence (αn) for the producers’ utility converging to α, then
−u∗p(αn, Fn) −−−→n→∞ supα {−u
∗
p(α, F (α))}, (3.26)
where Fn = F (αn) is the sequence of equilibrium prices corresponding to αn. Let us now
prove that both the equilibrium prices Fn and the optimal strategies hn = hp(αn) = −hs(αn)
are bounded; henceforth hn → h and Fn → F by possibly passing to a subsequence.
The upper semicontinuity of up, condition (USC) and the definition of the sup-convolution
yield that
lim sup
n→+∞
u(αn, 0) ≤ lim sup
n→+∞
{up(αn, hn) + us(αn,−hn)} ≤ up(α, h) + us(α,−h) ≤ u(α, 0),
which is finite by (3.24). Moreover, due to condition (3.23) there exists a neighborhood V of 0
such that
inf
hp∈V
inf
n∈N
up(α
n, hp) > −∞.
Hence, there exist constants c1 ∈ R and c2 > 0 such that
−u∗p(αn, Fn) = sup
hp∈R
{up(αn, hp)− Fnhp} ≥ c1 + c2|Fn|
and similarly−u∗s(αn, Fn) ≥ c1+c2|Fn|. Therefore, 2c1+2c2|Fn| ≤ supn∈N u(αn, 0) < +∞
showing that (Fn) is bounded. Since
−u∗p(αn, Fn) = up(αn, hn)− hnFn,
it follows from Corollary 3.3 that (hn) is also bounded.
Step 3: Finally, the goal is to identify F as the desired equilibrium price, that is, prove that
F = F (α). We start by showing that
u∗p(α
n, Fn) −−−→
n→∞ u
∗
p(α, F ). (3.27)
Indeed, by continuity of up(α, hp) in α we get that hpFn − up(αn, hp) → hpF − up(α, hp).
Thus, by the definition of the conjugate u∗p(α, F ) = infhp{hpF − up(α, hp)}, it follows that
lim sup
n→∞
u∗p(α
n, Fn) ≤ u∗p(α, F ).
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Moreover, equilibrium prices belonging to the supergradient of u, ensures that
lim inf
n→∞ u
∗
p(α
n, Fn) = lim inf
n→∞ {h
nFn − up(αn, hn)} ≥ hF − up(α, h) ≥ u∗p(α, F )
and thus lim infn→∞ u∗p(αn, Fn) ≥ u∗p(α, F ). Hence (3.27) holds. The same argumentation
implies that u∗s(αn, Fn)→ u∗s(α, F ).
Next, we show that u(αn, 0)→ u(α, 0). On the one hand, there exists an h′ ∈ R such that
u(α, 0) = up(α, h
′) + us(α,−h′) = lim
n→∞{up(α
n, h′) + us(αn,−h′)} ≤ lim inf
n→∞ u(α
n, 0).
The first equality holds since the supremum is attained, the second follows from the continuity
of up and us in α and the last one by (3.19). On the other hand, (hn) converging to h implies
lim sup
n→∞
u(αn, 0) = lim sup
n→∞
{up(αn, hn) + us(αn,−hn)} ≤ up(α, h) + us(α,−h) ≤ u(α, 0),
making use of the same argumentation for each equality as above.
Summarizing, using the convergence of the sup-convolutions, (3.22), (3.20) and the conver-
gence of the conjugates, we arrive at
u(α, 0) = lim
n→∞u(α
n, 0) = lim
n→∞{−u
∗
p(α
n, Fn)− u∗s(αn, Fn)} = −u∗p(α, F )− u∗s(α, F ).
(3.28)
In particular, the sup-convolution u(α, 0) is attained at hp(α) = h and hs(α) = −h ∈ R for
which hp(α) + hs(α) = 0. Therefore, according to (3.26) and (3.28) the pair (α, hp(α)) and
hs(α) are optimal trading strategies for the price F which satisfy the clearing condition. Hence
(α, hp(α), F ) is an equilibrium. 
4. A model with continuous trading and dependent markets
In this section, we consider a model where investors are allowed to trade continuously over
time in the financial market, while the dynamics of the financial and the commodity markets are
dependent and driven by Lévy processes. The aim is to derive explicit representations for the
optimization problems of the producers and the investors.
Lévy processes have been used for modeling variables in finance, such as stocks or interest
rates, whose return distributions exhibit fat tails and skew, because they can combine realistic
features with analytical tractability; see e.g. Carr et al. [12], Cont and Tankov [18], Eberlein [20]
and Schoutens [54]. Gorton and Rouwenhorst [29] provide evidence that commodity futures
exhibit similar behavior. Using Lévy processes, we can easily combine diffusions with jump
processes, while different types of dependence structures can also be incorporated.
In the model considered in this section, the investors observe the evolution of the consumers’
demand through time and adjust their trading strategy dynamically20. Moreover, the uncertainty
20It is implicitly assumed that the investors’ investment choices are independent of their possible commodity con-
sumption policy. This assumption has been imposed in the majority of the related literature (cf. [1, 13, 24, 35]) and
implies that the consumers or corporations that use the commodity to produce other goods are only a small part
of the investors’ side and their possible joint optimization problem is negligible when the investors are considered
as a whole.
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in the evolution of the consumers’ demand and the evolution of the financial market are depen-
dent processes which can exhibit ‘shocks’ (i.e. large jumps). The producers are trading in the
forward market only at discrete time instances, associated with their production schedule21. This
setting reflects real-world situations, in the sense that the arrival of certain news can affect both
the demand for a certain commodity as well as the financial market, these processes are observ-
able over time and investors typically trade continuously in the financial market and adjust their
portfolios according to new information.
Consider a complete stochastic basis (Ω,F ,F,P) whereF = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] denotes the filtration
(flow of information). Let Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] be an Rd-valued Lévy process with characteristic
triplet (b, c, ν), where b ∈ Rd, c is a symmetric, non-negative definite d × d matrix and ν is a
Lévy measure; see e.g. Applebaum [5], Kyprianou [46] or Sato [53] for more details on Lévy
processes. Denote the set of exponential moments of Zt, t ∈ [0, T ], by
UZ =
{
u ∈ Rd : E[e〈u,Zt〉] <∞} = {u ∈ Rd : ∫
|x|>1
e〈u,x〉ν(dx) <∞
}
. (4.1)
This set is convex and contains the origin, cf. Sato [53, Thm. 25.17]. Assuming that 0 ∈ U◦Z ,
exponential moments exist and the Lévy–Itô decomposition takes the form
Zt = bt+
√
cWt +
t∫
0
∫
Rd
x(µZ − νZ)(ds, dx), (4.2)
where µZ is the random measure of jumps of the process Z with compensator νZ = Leb ⊗ ν.
The moment generating function of Zt is well-defined for every u ∈ UZ and we know from the
Lévy–Khintchine formula that
E
[
e〈u,Zt〉
]
= exp
(
tκ(u)
)
, (4.3)
where κ denotes the cumulant generating function of Z1, that is
κ(u) = 〈u, b〉+ 〈u, cu〉
2
+
∫
Rd
(e〈u,x〉 − 1− 〈u, x〉)ν(dx). (4.4)
Moreover, if 0 ∈ U◦Z , then the cumulant generating function κ is real analytic in the interior of
U and thus smooth; cf. Eberlein and Glau [21, Lemma 2.1].
The uncertainty in the financial and the commodity markets is modeled using the Lévy process
Z and a factor structure. More precisely, we consider vectors u1, u2 ∈ Rd that specify how Z
influences each market. We will incorporate the financial market in a representative stock index
whose discounted price process S is modeled by
St = S0e
Yt where Yt = 〈u1, Zt〉 , (4.5)
21The fact that dynamic trading of the commodity forward contract is not considered implies that producers counter-
part the position of investors only at the initial and the terminal time for hedging purposes. During the time period
(0, T ), investors may trade in the forward market and form their representative agent’s position. The focus of our
analysis is how the interaction of producers and investors results in the equilibrium prices at times 0 and T .
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with S0 ∈ R+ and t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the random variable X that determines the consumers’
demand function at the terminal time is modeled via
X = 〈u2, ZT 〉 . (4.6)
4.1. The producers’ optimization problem revisited
The cumulant generating function of the random variable X = 〈u2, ZT 〉 in this setting, using
(4.3), takes the form
κX(v) = κ(vu2)T =: κ2(v)T, (4.7)
and the set of exponential moments equals UX = {v ∈ R : vu2 ∈ UZ}. Therefore, the function
up in the producers’ optimization problem (3.7)–(3.8) can be rewritten as
up(α, h
p) =
{
q(α, 0)− 1γpκ2
(− γp`(α, hp))T − hp`(α,−µ), if (α, hp) ∈ U˜X ,
−∞, otherwise. (4.8)
Moreover, if conditions (EM) and (COE) are satisfied, this function is concave, upper semicon-
tinuous and coercive; cf. Corollary 3.3.
Remark 4.1. Let us briefly discuss for which Lévy processes conditions (EM) and (COE) are
satisfied. Condition (EM) is standard in mathematical finance and is satisfied by the majority of
Lévy models, for example, by the generalized hyperbolic, the CGMY and the Meixner processes.
The set UZ is bounded for the majority of Lévy models, in particular for the aforementioned
ones. The only exceptions popular in mathematical finance are Brownian motion and Merton’s
jump-diffusion model. In these cases however the existence of a Brownian part ensures that
(COE) is satisfied. 
4.2. The investors’ optimization problem revisited
The investors in this setting can trade continuously in the asset S which incorporates the financial
market according to an admissible strategy θ. In other words, the set of trading outcomes equals
G =
{
GT (θ) =
T∫
0
θudSu : θ ∈ Θ
}
,
where the set of admissible trading strategies is defined by
Θ =
{
θ ∈ L(S) : G(θ) is a Q-martingale for every Q ∈Mf
}
, (4.9)
while L(S) denotes the set of predictable, S-integrable processes andMf the set of absolutely
continuous local martingale measures with finite entropy, that is
Mf =
{
Q P on FT : S is a Q-local martingale andH(Q|P) <∞
}
. (4.10)
The (NA) condition is subsequently adjusted to the following one:
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(NA′) Mf ∩QX 6= ∅.
The investors’ position (2.9) takes now the form
w(θ, hs) = hs(PT − F ) +GT (θ), (4.11)
and the aim is to derive an explicit expression for their optimization problem, in particular for
the function us(α, hs) in (3.11).
Define the measure Ps via the Radon–Nikodym derivative
dPs
dP
=
exp (−γshsPT )
E [exp (−γshsPT )]
(2.8)
=
exp
(
−γshsm X
)
E
[
exp
(
−γshsm X
)] (4.6)= exp
(
−
〈
γshs
m u2, ZT
〉)
E
[
exp
(
−
〈
γshs
m u2, ZT
〉)] ,
(4.12)
for every hs such that −γshsm u2 ∈ UZ . The following lemma provides the dynamics of the
process Z under Ps .
Lemma 4.2. The process Z remains a Lévy process under Ps with cumulant generating function
provided by
κs(v) = κ (v + ξ)− κ (ξ) , (4.13)
where ξ := −γshsm u2, for all v ∈ Rd such that v + ξ ∈ UZ . Moreover, the Lévy triplet of the
univariate Lévy process 〈ui, Z〉, i = 1, 2, under Ps is provided by
bsi = 〈ui, b〉+ 〈ui, cξ〉+
∫
Rd
〈ui, x〉
(
e〈ξ,x〉 − 1)ν(dx)
csi = 〈ui, cui〉
νsi (E) =
∫
Rd
1E(〈ui, x〉) e〈ξ,x〉ν(dx), E ∈ B(Rd).
Proof. See e.g. Shiryaev [55, Theorem VII.3.1] for the first part and Eberlein et al. [23, Theorem
4.1] for the second. 
The exponential transform of the process Y = 〈u1, Z〉 is denoted by Y˜ , that is E(Y˜ ) = eY .
The process Y˜ is again a Lévy process and its triplet, relative to Ps , is given by
b˜s1 = b
s
1 +
cs1
2
+
∫
R
(ex − 1− x)νs1(dx) = κs1(1)
c˜s1 = c
s
1 = c1 (4.14)
ν˜s1(E) =
∫
R
1E(e
x − 1)νs1(dx), E ∈ B(R);
see Kallsen and Shiryaev [41, Lemma 2.7]. Here, κs1 denotes the cumulant generating function
of Y under Ps and is given by (4.3) using the triplet (bs1, cs1, νs1).
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Now, recalling (2.10) and (4.11), the investors’ utility takes the following form:
Us
(
w(θ, hs)
)
= − 1
γs
logE
[
exp
(
− γs
[
hs(PT − F ) +GT (θ)
])]
(2.8)
= − 1
γs
logE
[
exp
(
− γs
[hs
m
X +GT (θ)
])]
+ C1(h
s, α, F )
(4.12)
= − 1
γs
logEs
[
exp
(
− γsGT (θ)
)]
+ C1(h
s, α, F )− C2(hs), (4.15)
where
C1(h
s, α, F ) := hs
(
φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
− F
)
and C2(hs) :=
T
γs
κ2
(
−γsh
s
m
)
.
(4.16)
The next result provides the solution of the optimization problem with respect to the financial
market. We will also make use of the following condition:
(FE) There exists η∗ ∈ R such that ∫
{x>1}
exeη∗e
x
νs1(dx) <∞, (4.17)
which solves the equation
∂
∂v
κ˜s1(v)
∣∣
v=η∗
= 0, (4.18)
where κ˜s1 denotes the cumulant generating function of Y˜ under Ps .
Proposition 4.3. Assume that (EM) and (FE) hold. Then
sup
θ∈Θ
{
− 1
γs
logEs
[
exp
(
− γsGT (θ)
)]}
= − 1
γs
κ˜s1(η∗)T. (4.19)
Proof. According to Fujiwara [27, Theorem 4.2] and using condition (FE), we have that
sup
θ∈Θ
{
− 1
γs
logEs
[
exp
(
− γsGT (θ)
)]}
= − 1
γs
log inf
θ∈Θ
Es
[
exp
(
− γsGT (θ)
)]
=
1
γs
inf
Q∈Mf
H(Q|Ps) = 1
γs
H(P∗|Ps), (4.20)
where P∗ denotes the measure minimizing the relative entropy with respect to Ps .
The function x 7→ |ex− 1|eη∗(ex−1) is submultiplicative and bounded by exeη∗ex on {x > 1},
thus condition (FE) in conjunction with Sato [53, Theorem 25.3] and (4.14) yield that
Es
[
|Y˜T |eη∗Y˜T
]
<∞.
21
Applying Hubalek and Sgarra [38, Theorems 4 and 8], we get that the minimal entropy martin-
gale measure for eY exists and coincides with the Esscher martingale measure for Y˜ . The latter
is provided by
dP∗
dPs
=
eη∗Y˜T
Es
[
eη∗Y˜T
] , (4.21)
where η∗ is the root of equation (4.18). Finally, using the martingale property of Y˜ (cf. [38,
Remark 4]), we deduce that
H(P∗|Ps) = E∗
[
η∗Y˜T − κ˜s1(η∗)T
]
= −κ˜s1(η∗)T,
which in turn implies the desired result. 
Therefore, using (4.15)–(4.16) and Proposition 4.3, the investors’ optimization problem can
be written as
Πs = sup
θ∈Θ, hs∈R
{
− 1
γs
logEs
[
exp
(
− γsGT (θ)
)]
+ C1(h
s, α, F )− C2(hs)
}
= sup
hs∈R
{
− T
γs
(
κ˜s1(η∗) + κ2
(
−γsh
s
m
))
+ hs
(
φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
− F
)}
. (4.22)
In other words, recalling (3.12) and (3.14), the investors’ optimization problem has the repre-
sentation
Πs = sup
hs∈R
{
us(α, h
s)− hsF} = −u∗s(α, F ), (4.23)
where the function us(α, hs) admits the explicit expression
us(α, h
s) =
{
− Tγs
(
κ˜s1(η∗) + κ2
(
−γshsm
))
+ hs
(
φ0(piT )− α(1−ε)m
)
, if −γshsm u2 ∈ UZ ,
−∞, otherwise.
(4.24)
Remark 4.4. Using the upper semicontinuity and the smoothness of the cumulant generating
function together with the inverse function theorem, it follows from the explicit expression
(4.24) that the function hs 7→ us(α, hs) is upper semicontinuous. Thus, condition (COE) is
automatically satisfied in the current setting (provided that (EM) and (FE) hold). 
Remark 4.5. Let us also discuss for which Lévy processes conditions (NA′) and (FE) are sat-
isfied. (NA′) is rather mild since it requires the existence of an equivalent martingale measure
(EMM) with finite entropy under which the random variable X = 〈u2, ZT 〉 has finite first mo-
ment. Explicit constructions of EMMs for Lévy processes are studied in Eberlein and Jacod [22]
and in Cherny and Shiryaev [16]. (FE) is also standard in the literature related to exponential
utility maximization and entropic hedging. Hubalek and Sgarra [38] provide explicit parameter
regimes for this condition to be satisfied, which fit well with empirical data. 
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Remark 4.6. Condition (NA′) implies that the investors’ indifference price for the commodity
is bounded from above. More precisely, the (buyer’s) indifference price for a random payoff CT
is defined as the solution p(CT ) of the equation
sup
G∈G
Us
(
G− p(CT ) + CT
)
= sup
G∈G
Us(G).
According to Delbaen et al. [19, §5.2] or Fujiwara and Miyahara [28, §4] (see also Laeven and
Stadje [47]), the indifference price of an agent with exponential utility and risk aversion equal
to γs admits the following representation
p(CT ) = inf
Q∈Mf
{
EQ[CT ] +
1
γs
H(Q|P)
}
− 1
γs
H(Q∗|P), (4.25)
whereQ∗ is the martingale measure minimizing the entropy with respect to P. With this at hand,
(2.8) yields the assertion. 
We conclude this subsection with a statement analogous to Proposition 3.2 for the investors’
side, thereby strengthening the results of Proposition 3.5. More specifically, we show that the
investors’ optimization problem admits a maximizer for every α ∈ [0, pi0] and every forward
price in the no-arbitrage interval, which is defined by
NA :=
(
inf
Q∈Mf
EQ[PT ], sup
Q∈Mf
EQ[PT ]
)
.
Proposition 4.7. Assume that conditions (EM), (FE) and (NA′) hold. Then, for every F ∈ NA
and α ∈ [0, pi0] there exists a maximizer hˆs ∈ R for the producers’ problem Πs such that
−γsm hˆsu2 ∈ UZ .
Proof. By the definition of indifference valuation and the cash invariance property of the utility
functional Us, we have that
us(α, h
s) = sup
θ∈Θ
Us
(
GT (θ)
)
+ p(hsPT ). (4.26)
Building on the above representation, it suffices to show that p(hsPT )− hsF is concave, upper
semicontinuous and coercive. Concavity is readily implied by (4.25), while upper semicontinuity
follows from the fact that us is upper semicontinuous; cf. Remark 4.4. As for coercivity, using
again (4.25) we get that for every hs > 0
p(hsPT )− hsF = inf
Q∈Mf
{
EQ[hsPT ] +
1
γs
H(Q|P)
}
− 1
γs
H(Q∗|P)− hsF
= hs
(
inf
Q∈Mf
{
EQ[PT ] +
1
hsγs
H(Q|P)
}
− 1
hsγs
H(Q∗|P)− F
)
.
Moreover, it holds that
inf
Q∈Mf
{
EQ[PT ] +
1
hsγs
H(Q|P)
}
− 1
hsγs
H(Q∗|P) −−−−−→
hs→+∞
inf
Q∈Mf
{EQ[PT ]},
hence p(hsPT ) − hsF goes to −∞ as hs → +∞, for every F ∈ NA. The limit as hs → −∞
follows by similar argumentation and using the payoff −PT instead of PT . 
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Remark 4.8. Proposition 4.7 states that for every fixed pair of parameters (α, F ) ∈ [0, pi0]×NA,
the individual problem of the investors admits a finite solution. This solution is unique if the
indifference price p(hsPT ) is strictly concave as a function of hs. In view of representation
(4.25), strict concavity is guaranteed if {EQ[X] : Q ∈Mf} is not a singleton, meaning that the
variate X determining the consumers’ demand is not a replicable payoff. 
4.3. The equilibrium revisited
Finally, we can further strengthen the result on the existence of an equilibrium in the current
setting, by showing that the equilibrium forward price is unique and belongs to the no-arbitrage
interval.
Proposition 4.9. Assume that conditions (EM), (COE), (USC), (NA′) and (3.23) hold. Then
there exists an equilibrium (αˆ, hˆ, Fˆ ), where Fˆ ∈ NA is unique.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.6, we only need to show that Fˆ ∈ NA and is unique. Assume,
for instance, that Fˆ ≤ inf
Q∈Mf
EQ[PT ]. Taking into account the proof of Theorem 3.6 as well as
representations (4.25) and (4.26), we get that
hˆs = argmax
hs∈R
{
us(h
s, αˆ)− hsFˆ
}
= argmax
hs∈R
{
p(hsPT (αˆ))− hsFˆ
}
= argmax
hs∈R
{
inf
Q∈Mf
{
hs
(
EQ[PT (αˆ)]− Fˆ
)
+
1
γs
H(Q|P)
}}
= +∞
The last statement contradicts the fact that hˆs+hˆp = 0 and hˆp ∈ R. The uniqueness of Fˆ follows
from the smoothness of the cumulant generating function and the inverse function theorem,
together with Remark 3.7. 
Remark 4.10. Assumption (FE) guarantees that there exists an optimal trading strategy for the
investors and is necessary in deriving the explicit expression (4.24). However, it is not a neces-
sary condition for the existence of an equilibrium. 
5. Examples, numerical illustrations and discussion
In this final section, we consider two specific models for the evolution of the financial market and
the consumers’ demand. The first one is driven by correlated Brownian motions and the second
one incorporates dependent jumps in addition. In the first case, we derive explicit expressions
for the optimal storage policy and the optimal forward volume, and then the equilibrium price
follows by the market clearing condition (2.12). In the second case, we derive semi-explicit
expressions for the optimal storage policy and the optimal forward volume, and the equilibrium
price is then computed numerically. Thereafter, we study the effect of the various parameters, in
particular the risk aversion coefficients of both agents and the production levels, in the formation
of spot and forward prices.
24
5.1. A model driven by Brownian motion
In the first example, the dynamics of the variates X and Y determining the consumers demand
and the financial market are driven by correlated Brownian motions. Specifically
Yt = b1t+ σ1W
1
t and Xt = σ2W
2
t , (5.1)
where W 1,W 2 are standard Brownian motions with correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Moreover, using
(2.8), the mean and variance of the spot price are given by
E[PT ] = φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
and Var[PT ] =
σ22T
m2
. (5.2)
The ensuing result provides an explicit expression for the optimal inventory policy and the opti-
mal investment in the forward contract.
Proposition 5.1. Assuming the model dynamics provided by (5.1), the optimal strategy (αˆ, hˆp)
for the producers’ problem is given by
αˆ =
(
d3d5 − 2d2d4
4d1d4 − d23
∨ 0
)
∧ pi0 and hˆp = − αˆd3 + d5
2d4
, (5.3)
while the optimal position hˆs for the investors’ problem equals
hˆs =
E[PT ]− F
γ¯sVar[PT ]
− λρ
√
T
γ¯s
√
Var[PT ]
. (5.4)
Here, the constants d1, . . . ,d5 are provided by (A.5) and γ¯s = γs(1− ρ2).
The proof of the preceding Proposition is postponed for Appendix A.
The equilibrium forward price Fˆ will be derived endogenously via the clearing condition
(2.12), where we should note that αˆ, hˆp and hˆs all depend on Fˆ . Thereafter, the equilibrium spot
price of the commodity at the initial time is provided by
P0(Fˆ ) = φ0(pi0) +
αˆ(Fˆ )
m
. (5.5)
In this example, both the forward price and the optimal forward position are unique; this follows
from Remark 3.7, Proposition 4.9 and the fact that up(αˆ, ·) and us(αˆ, ·) are strictly concave; see
their explicit forms in (A.4) and (A.15).
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6 exhibit how the storage amount, the forward volume, the spot price,
the forward premium and the convenience yield at the equilibrium depend on the correlation
between the consumers’ demand and the financial market, as well as on the producers’ and
investors’ risk aversion coefficients; see also the discussion in subsection 5.3.
Remark 5.2. Let us consider the case α∗ = 0. Then, the optimal position for the producers
simplifies to
hˆp(F ) =
E[PT ]− F
γpVar[PT ]
− piT (5.6)
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and the clearing condition (2.12) yields that the equilibrium forward price is provided by
Fˆ = E[PT ]− γpγ¯s
γp + γ¯s
Var[PT ]
(
λρ
√
T
γ¯s
√
Var[PT ]
+ piT
)
. (5.7)
Remark 5.3. In case there does not exist a forward contract that the producers could use for
hedging—hence, there are also no investors in the market—the producers’ optimization problem
takes the form
Πpnf = max
α∈[0,pi0]
{
d1α
2 + d2α+ d
′
3
}
, (5.8)
where d1, d2 are given by (A.5). Therefore, the optimal storage strategy equals
αˆ = (α∗ ∨ 0) ∧ pi0 with α∗ = − d2
2d1
, (5.9)
and the spot price of the commodity is
P0(αˆ) = φ0(pi0) +
αˆ
m
. 
5.2. A jump-diffusion model
In the next example, the dynamics of the variates that determine the consumers’ demand and the
financial market are driven by a Lévy jump-diffusion process, where the Brownian motion rep-
resents the ‘normal’ market behavior while the jumps appear simultaneously and represent some
‘shocks’, e.g. news announcements, that affect both the financial asset price and the demand for
the commodity. More precisely, the dynamics of the processes Y and X are described by
Yt = b1t+ σ1W
1
t + η1Nt and Xt = b2t+ σ2W
2
t + η2Nt, (5.10)
where the drift term equals bi = b¯i − ληi with b¯i, ηi ∈ R and σi ∈ R+, i = 1, 2. Furthermore,
W 1,W 2 are standard Brownian motions with correlation ρ, while N is a univariate Poisson
process with intensity λ ∈ R+. Hence, the constants η1 and η2 represent the effect of a jump in
the financial market and the demand for the commodity, respectively.
Moreover, assuming b¯2 = 0 as in the previous example, the expectation of XT equals zero
and using (2.8) we get that
E[PT ] = φ0(piT )− α(1− ε)
m
and Var[PT ] =
σ22 + λη
2
2
m2
T. (5.11)
Observe that the presence of jumps, either negative or positive, increases the variance of the spot
price PT relative to the Brownian motion example. The next result provides an expression for
the optimal inventory policy and the optimal investment in the forward contract.
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium storage amount (top-left), volume in forward contracts (top-right), spot
price (bottom-left) and forward premium (bottom-right) as a function of correlation
for different values of the producers’ risk aversion γp.
Proposition 5.4. Assuming the model dynamics provided by (5.10), the optimal strategy αˆ, hˆp
for the producers’ problem is provided by αˆ = (α∗ ∨ 0)∧pi0 and hˆp = hp,∗(αˆ) where (α∗, hp,∗)
solve the system of equations{
2d1α+ d2 + d3h
p + λη2T (1−ε)m e
−γpη2`(α,hp) = 0,
d3α+ 2d4h
p + d5 +
λη2T
m e
−γpη2`(α,hp) = 0.
(5.12)
Here d1, . . . ,d5 are given by (A.5) by replacing Var[PT ] with
σ22T
m2
. The optimal investment for
the investors’ problem hˆs is provided by the solution to the equation
∂
∂hs
{
− T
γs
[
κ˜s1(η∗) + κ2
(
−γsh
s
m
)]}
= F − E[PT ], (5.13)
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Figure 5.2: Equilibrium storage amount (top-left), volume in forward contracts (top-right), spot
price (bottom-left) and forward premium (bottom-right) as a function of correlation
for different values of the investors’ risk aversion γs.
where η∗ is given by (A.31).
The proof of the preceding Proposition is postponed for Appendix A.
Similarly to the previous example, the unique equilibrium forward price Fˆ is derived endoge-
nously via the clearing condition (2.12), by noting again that αˆ, hˆp and hˆs depend on Fˆ , and the
equilibrium spot price of the commodity at the initial time is again given by (5.5). Therefore,
in order to determine the equilibrium we need to solve equations (5.12) and (5.13). To this end,
we have used numerical techniques, and have subsequently examined the impact of jumps on
equilibrium quantities; see Figure 5.5 and the discussion in subsection 5.3.
Remark 5.5. Using an independent Brownian motion instead of the Poisson process in (5.10),
we can get the same first and second moments for PT as the ones in (5.11). This will also result
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Figure 5.3: Equilibrium storage amount as a function of correlation for a market with and with-
out forward contract. On the left piT = 0.3pi0 and on the right piT = 0.6pi0.
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Figure 5.4: Expected percentage price changes (E[PˆT ] − Pˆ0)/Pˆ0 as a function of the produc-
tion piT (given that pi0 = 100) with and without forward contract. On the left, the
correlation ρ = 0.2 and on the right ρ = 0.7.
in higher forward premia. However, jump processes are more appropriate models for the shocks
that occur in random times and, in addition, jumps (in contrast to another Brownian motion)
allow for asymmetries in the distributions, like fat tails and skewness. See also the discussion in
the introduction of Section 4. 
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Figure 5.5: Equilibrium spot price (left) and forward premium (right) as a function of correlation
for different values of the demand shock effect η2 (in this example η1 = 0).
5.3. Discussion of the results
Producers’ risk aversion and spot/forward prices
We can use the results above to create several figures that illustrate the effect of the model
parameters on the equilibrium quantities. We first examine the producers’ side. The quantities
that the producers have to consider are provided by w(α, hp) in (2.1). We may split the terms
into deterministic and stochastic ones. The deterministic part consists of the spot revenues from
selling pi0 − α units of the commodity at the spot price P0, the expected future revenues from
selling piT + α(1− ε) units at the price E[PT ], and the expected payoff of the short position hp
in forward contracts. The stochastic term stems from the randomness of the future price PT and
equals [α(1− ε) + hp + piT ]X/m. One can readily see that the deterministic term is decreasing
with respect to α. However, the risk in the stochastic term is also reduced for decreasing storage
amounts. Assuming that E[X] = 0, this risk is minimized when the quantity α(1−ε)+hp+piT
vanishes, that is, when all the future sales are hedged22. Hence, a large amount of the commodity
in storage implies also a large position to be hedged and vice versa (all else equal).
Considering only the deterministic term, and assuming that µ is sufficiently large, producers
have motive to store their production only if piT is relatively smaller than pi0 (recall the discussion
in Remark 3.4). In any case, storing part of their production now increases the spot price of the
commodity. In addition, because producers are risk averse, in order to hedge their future risk
exposure, they are willing to share some of their future revenues by taking a short position in
the forward contract. Naturally, the higher the risk aversion the larger the short position in the
forward contract (see the top-right of Figure 5.1) and the higher the forward premium paid to the
investors (see the bottom-right of Figure 5.1). Moreover, a larger position in forward contracts
22Note that if the expectation of the random term X is large, then producers are encouraged to increase the storage
and supply more units at the terminal time. This speculative move explains how the storage may amplify the
effects of a positive shock in demand which increases the spot price.
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implies an increasing tendency for storage, thus higher risk aversion leads to increased storage
amounts (see the top-left of Figure5.1). Summarizing, even when the production levels at time 0
and T are close, producers with higher risk aversion tend to store more of their production when
they can hedge the risk of future sales, a result which is consistent with the theory of storage,
and this strategy increases the spot price of the commodity (see the bottom-left of Figure 5.1).
This result is further supported by the model without a forward contract in the market, see
Remark 5.3. There, we observe that the only motive for the producers to store the commodity
stems from the possible uneven productions (i.e. the difference between pi0 and piT ). This motive
to store is increased when partial hedging is possible through the trading in forward contracts. In
fact, as illustrated in Figure 5.3, the optimal storage is always higher in the model with forward
contract, for every level of uneven productions, while for piT close to or higher than pi0, the
optimal storage without forward contract is zero. Thus, spot prices in the model without forward
contract are always lower compared to the model with forward. However, higher storage implies
that the future expected spot price decreases (see for instance relation (5.2)), assuming that there
is no rolling of the position in the forward contracts. Hence, while forward contracts tend to
increase the spot commodity price, they also tend to decrease the future spot price. Therefore,
the presence of forward contracts in the commodity market stabilizes prices when the production
levels are uneven. This is apparent in Figure 5.4, where the expected price changes (E[PˆT ] −
Pˆ0)/Pˆ0 are illustrated for different values of piT . In this example, we note that when there is
scarcity of the commodity at time T , forward contracts serve to stabilize commodity spot prices.
On the contrary, when the production at initial time is lower than that at terminal time, then the
expected price difference remains the same with and without the forward contract.
Let us also discuss the effect of jumps in the equilibrium quantities. Figure 5.5 illustrates the
effect of a possible side shock in the consumers’ demand stemming from a jump. This jump not
only increases the risk of the future price but it is also unhedgeable, since it is independent from
the evolution of the stock market (we have assumed η1 = 0). Therefore, the forward premium
paid to the investors is higher, irrespective of the sign of the jump (see the right part of Figure
5.5). Moreover, when the future price is riskier, recalling the discussion above, we conclude
that the more risk averse the producers are the more they increase the amount they store and
hence they also increase the spot price of the commodity (see the left part of Figure 5.5). In
addition, note that the sign of the jump makes little difference in the equilibrium quantities (if
the expectation of the future demand shock is kept equal to zero).
The effect of the producers’ risk aversion on market equilibrium can be used to examine how
the number of producers affects the equilibrium commodity prices. In the present framework
of CARA preferences, the parameter 1/γp measures the producers’ aggregate risk tolerance.
Therefore, if the number of producers increases, the parameter γp decreases and the analysis
above implies that equilibrium spot prices are lower, as expected.
Investors’ risk aversion and spot/forward prices
Let us now examine the investors’ side. When they become more risk averse, they are less
willing to undertake the risk of a forward position. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2 (top-right),
where the percentage hˆ/(piT + αˆ) (i.e. the percentage of forward contracts with respect to the
total supply at time T ) is plotted. Also, as the theory of normal backwardation states, more
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risk averse investors would require higher forward premium to enter into the forward contract.
This premium is usually measured by the fraction (E[PˆT ] − Fˆ )/Fˆ which is plotted in Figure
5.2 (bottom-right). On the other hand, a higher forward premium implies that hedging is more
expensive for the producers, hence they intend to supply more in the spot market and store less;
note that the optimal storage amount even equals zero in some cases as the top-left of Figure 5.2
shows). Summarizing, when investors are more risk averse they invest less in forward contracts,
which reduces the amount that producers can use for hedging; thus, producers offer more on the
spot market, rendering equilibrium spot prices lower (see the bottom-left of Figure 5.2).
Turning our attention to the effect of the correlation between the consumers’ demand and the
financial markets’ return, we note that the equilibrium quantities mainly depend on the square
of ρ; this is basically because investors can go both long and short in the stock market. When
ρ2 increases, the effective risk aversion of the investors’, which is γ¯s = γs(1 − ρ2), decreases.
Therefore, an increase of ρ2 is eventually equivalent to a decrease of γs. This is expected because
when the financial and the commodity markets are correlated, the investors can partially hedge
the risk they undertake on a forward commodity contract by adjusting their investment strategy
in the stock market accordingly. Hence, they become more risk tolerant. The dependence of the
equilibrium quantities on the correlation coefficient ρ is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
The effect of the investors’ risk aversion on market equilibrium can be used to examine how
the number of investors affects the equilibrium commodity prices. In the present framework of
CARA preferences, the parameter 1/γs measures the investors’ aggregate risk tolerance. Hence,
if the number of investors increases, the parameter γs considered in the above analysis decreases.
As we have seen, the latter implies, among other things, higher equilibrium spot prices. This
theoretical result is consistent with the observed comovement of the amounts invested in the
commodity forward contracts and the commodity spot prices (see the related discussion in the
introduction).
Convenience yield, correlation and uneven productions
As mentioned in the introduction, the convenience yield is a measure of the implicit benefit that
inventory holders receive. Positivity of the convenience yield is consistent with the theory of
storage. In our model, the convenience yield denoted by y solves the equation
F = P0
1 +R
1− ε − yP0, (5.14)
see e.g. [1]. The relation of the yield with respect to the risk aversion coefficients of the producers
and the investors is illustrated in Figure 5.6. As expected, y is increasing with respect to both risk
aversion coefficients (all else equal). The relation for the producers’ side follows readily from
Figure 5.1, since higher producers’ risk aversion implies higher spot equilibrium price and higher
forward premium (and also lower equilibrium forward price). Similarly, as the risk tolerance of
the investors decreases, the cost of hedging increases, which makes producers sell more at the
spot rather than storing and selling at a future date (see, in particular, the bottom-right of Figure
5.2).
The relation of the yield with respect to the correlation coefficient is more involved. When
ρ2 increases, there are two effects of opposite directions on the convenience yield. The first is
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negative and stems from the decrease of the investors’ effective risk aversion, while the second
is positive and comes from the corresponding increase of the spot price (see the bottom-left of
Figure 5.1). The final outcome depends on the level of the risk aversions and the difference of
production levels (see Figures 5.6 and5.7). In particular, assuming that production levels are
close to each other, when producers are sufficiently risk averse (tolerant), y is decreasing (in-
creasing) in ρ2. Note also that the steep increase of the convenience yield when ρ approaches
zero (right graph on Figure 5.6) occurs when the storage is zero (compare with the top-left of
Figure 5.2), since in this case only the negative effect of ρ2 in the convenience yield occurs
(when the storage is zero, the spot price does not increase).
On the other hand, the difference between the production levels pi0 and piT could change the
monotonicity of the convenience yield with respect to the correlation coefficient. Indeed, when
production at time T is sufficiently larger than the initial production, storage is getting lower
and hence the negative effect of ρ in the convenience yield prevails. As the difference piT − pi0
decreases, the positive effect that stems from the increased spot price is getting more influential,
especially when producers are less risk averse (right of Figure 5.7).
Finally and as expected, for any correlation level, scarcity of commodity at initial time implies
higher convenience yield (see both sides of Figure 5.7). In particular, when piT is sufficiently
larger than pi0, the influence of the correlation ρ on the convenience yield increases, a fact that
reflects the producers’ benefit from satisfying their increased hedging through the forward con-
tract (the latter is more intense when producers are more risk averse).
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Figure 5.6: Equilibrium convenience yield as a function of correlation for different values of
producers’ risk aversion γp (left) and investors’ risk aversion γs (right), when the
production levels are equal (pi0 = piT ).
Remark 5.6. In Acharya et al. [1], the authors present an extensive empirical analysis, based on
an equilibrium model simpler than the one we have established and developed above. In Section
3 therein, data from spot and future markets of oil and gas is used for testing the predictions of
the model. Our model offers a much richer set-up, not only regarding the families of probability
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Figure 5.7: Equilibrium convenience yield as a function of correlation for different values of
production levels, when producers are more risk averse (left) and less risk averse
(right).
distributions, but also because it includes in the analysis the relation of commodity and stock
markets. One could apply similar methodology in order to test the predictions of our model, in
particular the relation between the correlation of the stock market and the commodity demand
with the forward premia, the volume in forward contracts and the optimal storage amount. We
leave this interesting task as a subject for future research. 
5.4. The effect of an existing hedge from a previous cycle
Aside from uneven production levels, another factor that decreases the producers’ tendency for
storing is an already undertaken hedging position from a previous production and trading cycle.
In this respect, we consider the situation where a forward contract with maturity T was already
issued during the previous cycle, and assume that producers have already taken a long position on
it. We then examine how this existing hedge affects the spot and forward equilibrium quantities.
More precisely, the total position of the producers’ takes the following form (compare to (2.1))
w(α, hp) = P0(pi0 − α)(1 +R) + PT (piT + α(1− ε)) + hp(PT − F ) + h′(PT − F ′),
(5.15)
where h′ denotes the position in the forward contract with maturity at time T that was bought
with strike price F ′ at the previous cycle. The optimization problem for the producers has again
the same form as in (2.3), and in particular for the model of subsection 5.1, it takes the form of
the following quadratic programming problem:
Πp = max
hp∈R,α∈[0,pi0]
{
d1α
2 + d′2α+ d3αh
p + d4(h
p)2 + d′5h
p + d6
}
, (5.16)
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where d1, d3,d4 remain the same and are provided by (A.5), while
d′2 =
2(1 +R)pi0 − (1− ε)(2piT + h′)− (R+ ε)µ
m
− γp(1− ε)(piT + h′)Var[PT ]
d′5 = −
(
F − µ− piT
m
)
− γp(piT + h′)Var[PT ].
We observe that an existing long position in the forward contract, i.e. h′ > 0, has the same
impact as an increase of future production piT . Therefore, as in Figures 5.3, positive h′ implies
less storage and hence lower spot equilibrium price. In addition, as in Figure 5.7, when producers
have already hedged some of their risk, the convenience yield increases, a fact that reflects
better inventory management. Similarly and as expected, a gradual hedging effectively serves to
stabilize commodity prices (see Figure 5.4). This is because the tendency to increase spot prices
by forward contracts is gradually applied to prices. Intuitively, when producers hedge the future
price uncertainty by rolling their position in the forward contract, the effect on the spot prices is
spread through time. Note, however, that an intimate analysis on the gradually optimal hedging
requires a dynamic version of our equilibrium model, which is left open for future research.
A. Proofs of Section 5
Proof (Proof of Proposition 5.1). The model with dynamics (5.1) fits in the framework of Sec-
tion 4 by considering a 2-dimensional Brownian motion Z whose characteristic triplet has the
form
b =
(
b1
0
)
, c =
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
)
and ν ≡ 0, (A.1)
where b ∈ R, σ1, σ2 ∈ R+ and ρ ∈ [−1, 1], while the vectors u1, u2 ∈ R2 have the form
u1 =
(
1
0
)
and u2 =
(
0
1
)
. (A.2)
The cumulant generating functions of Y1 = 〈u1, Z1〉 and X1 = 〈u2, Z1〉 are given by
κ1(v) = vb1 +
v2σ21
2
and κ2(v) =
v2σ22
2
. (A.3)
The set UZ equals R2, thus Assumption (EM) and (3.23) are trivially satisfied, while the same
is true for Assumption (FE) since ν ≡ 0. Assumption (COE) is also satisfied due to κ2 being
quadratic in u, while Assumption (NA′) is fulfilled since we can construct a martingale measure
under which Z remains a Brownian motion.
Starting with the producers’ side, the optimal hedging and storage positions are determined
by Proposition 3.2 and (4.8), leading to the following quadratic programming problem:
Πp = max
hp∈R,α∈[0,pi0]
{
d1α
2 + d2α+ d3αh
p + d4(h
p)2 + d5h
p + d6
}
, (A.4)
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where
d1 = −
(
1 +R+ (1− ε)2
m
+
γp(1− ε)2
2
Var[PT ]
)
d2 =
2(1 +R)pi0 − 2(1− ε)piT − (R+ ε)µ
m
− γp(1− ε)piT Var[PT ]
d3 = −1− ε
m
− γp(1− ε)Var[PT ] (A.5)
d4 = −γp
2
Var[PT ]
d5 = −
(
F − µ− piT
m
)
− γppiT Var[PT ].
The first order conditions yield the following solutions
hp,∗ = −αd3 + d5
2d4
and α∗ =
d3d5 − 2d2d4
4d1d4 − d23
. (A.6)
Therefore, the optimal strategy (αˆ, hˆp) ∈ [0, pi0]×R for the producers’ problem is provided by
αˆ = (α∗ ∨ 0) ∧ pi0 and hˆp = − αˆd3 + d5
2d4
. (A.7)
Next, we turn our attention to the investors’ problem and follow the strategy outlined in sub-
section 4.2. The cumulant generating function of Z under Ps is provided by
κs(v) = 〈v − ξ, b〉+ 〈v − ξ, c(v − ξ)〉
2
, (A.8)
where ξ = −γshsm u2. In particular, the characteristics of Y under Ps are
bs1 = b1 − ρσ1σ2
γsh
s
m
and cs1 = σ
2
1, (A.9)
thus the characteristics of the exponential transform Y˜ under Ps are
b˜s1 = b1 − ρσ1σ2
γsh
s
m
+
σ21
2
and c˜s1 = σ
2
1. (A.10)
The cumulant generating function of Y˜ simply has the form
κ˜s1(v) = v
(
b1 − ρσ1σ2γsh
s
m
+
σ21
2
)
+
v2σ21
2
, (A.11)
and its derivative obviously equals
∂
∂v
κ˜s1(v) = b1 − ρσ1σ2
γsh
s
m
+
σ21
2
+ vσ21. (A.12)
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Therefore, the solution to equation (4.18) is
η∗ = ρ
σ2
σ1
γsh
s
m
− b1
σ21
− 1
2
, (A.13)
and the minimal entropy equals
H(P∗|Ps) = T
2
(η∗σ1)2 =
T
2
(
λ− ρσ2γsh
s
m
)2
. (A.14)
Here λ denotes the ‘market price of risk’ for the asset S, i.e. λ = µ1−rσ1 , with µ1 being the
expected rate of return of S and r the continuously compounded interest rate, while we have
also used that b1 = µ1 − r − σ21/2.
The investors’ optimal position in the forward contract is determined by (4.24), leading to the
following quadratic optimization problem:
Πs = max
hs∈R
{
d7(h
s)2 + d8h
s + d9
}
, (A.15)
where
d7 = −γs
2
(1− ρ2)Var[PT ] (A.16)
d8 = E[PT ]− F − λρ
√
T
√
Var[PT ]. (A.17)
Applying the first order conditions once again, we arrive at the optimal position for the investors
hˆs =
E[PT ]− F
γ¯sVar[PT ]
− λρ
√
T
γ¯s
√
Var[PT ]
, (A.18)
where γ¯s = γs(1− ρ2). 
Proof (Proof of Proposition 5.4). The model with dynamics (5.10) fits in the framework of Sec-
tion 4 by considering a 2-dimensional Lévy process Z whose characteristic triplet has the form
b =
(
b1
b2
)
, c =
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
)
and ν(dx1, dx2) = λ1{η1,η2}(dx1, dx2), (A.19)
while the vectors u1, u2 ∈ R2 are provided by (A.2). The cumulant generating function of
Y1 = 〈u1, Z1〉 and X1 = 〈u2, Z1〉 is given by
κi(v) = vbi +
v2σ2i
2
+ λ (evηi − 1) i = 1, 2. (A.20)
The set UZ equals R2, thus Assumption (EM) and (3.23) are trivially satisfied, while the same
is true for Assumption (FE). Assumption (COE) is also satisfied due to κ2 being quadratic in v,
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while Assumption (NA′) is satisfied since we can construct a martingale measure under which
X has finite first moment.
Starting with the producers side, the optimal hedging and storage positions are provided by
Proposition 3.2 and (4.8), leading to the following optimization problem:
Πp = max
hp∈R,α∈[0,pi0]
f(α, hp) (A.21)
where
f(α, hp) := d1α
2 + d2α+ d3αh
p + d4(h
p)2 + d5h
p + d6 + j(α, h
p), (A.22)
with
j(α, hp) := −λ
(
e−γpη2`(α,h
p) − 1
) T
γp
. (A.23)
The coefficients d1, . . . ,d5 are provided by (A.5) by replacingVar[PT ] with
σ22T
m . The first order
optimality conditions lead to the system of non-linear equations (5.12), i.e.{
∂
∂αf(α, h
p) = 2d1α+ d2 + d3h
p + λη2T (1−ε)m e
−γpη2`(α,hp) = 0,
∂
∂hp f(α, h
p) = d3α+ 2d4h
p + d5 +
λη2T
m e
−γpη2`(α,hp) = 0,
(A.24)
and its solution is denoted by (α∗, hp,∗), where the relation of α∗ and hp,∗ is given by the fol-
lowing linear equation
α∗ =
2(1− ε)d4 − d3
2d1 − (1− ε)d3h
p,∗ +
(1− ε)d5 − d2
2d1 − (1− ε)d3 .
Therefore, the optimal strategy (αˆ, hˆp) ∈ [0, pi0]× R for the producers problem is provided by
αˆ = (α∗ ∨ 0) ∧ pi0 and hˆp = hp,∗(αˆ). (A.25)
Next, we turn our attention to the investors problem and follow again the strategy of subsection
4.2. The characteristics of Y under Ps are provided by Lemma 4.2, thus using (A.19) we get that
bs1 = b1 − ρσ1σ2ζ + λη1(e−η2ζ − 1)
cs1 = σ
2
1 (A.26)
1E(y) ∗ νs1 = 1E(〈u1, x〉)e〈ξ,x〉 ∗ ν,
where ζ := γsh
s
m , E ∈ B(R) and “∗” denotes integration. Therefore, the cumulant generating
function of Y under Ps takes the form
κs1(v) = vb
s
1 +
v2σ21
2
+ λ(evη1 − 1)e−ζη2 . (A.27)
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Moreover, the characteristics of the exponential transform Y˜ of Y are provided by (4.14), thus
we obtain that
b˜s1 = κ
s
1(1)
c˜s1 = σ
2
1 (A.28)
1E(z) ∗ ν˜s1 = 1E(ey − 1) ∗ νs1.
Hence, the cumulant generating function of Y˜ under Ps equals
κ˜s1(v) = vb˜
s
1 +
v2σ21
2
+ λe−η2ζ
(
ev(e
η1−1) − 1
)
(A.29)
and its derivative with respect to v equals
∂
∂v
κ˜s1(v) = b˜
s
1 + vσ
2
1 + λe
−η2ζev(e
η1−1)(eη1 − 1). (A.30)
The minimal entropy martingale measure is determined by the solution η∗ to the non-linear
equation
b˜s1 + η∗σ
2
1 + λe
−η2ζeη∗(e
η1−1)(eη1 − 1) = 0, (A.31)
and then the minimal entropy equals
H(P∗|Ps) = − T
γs
κ˜s1(η∗). (A.32)
Now, putting the pieces together, the investors optimization problem takes the form
Πs = max
hs
g(hs) (A.33)
where
g(hs) := − T
γs
{
κ˜s1(η∗) + κ2
(
−γsh
s
m
)}
+ hs
(
E[PT ]− F
)
, (A.34)
and the maximizer is determined by the first order conditions, leading to (5.13). 
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